Sanctions database

*** OFAC, in consultation with the State Department, issued a determination pursuant to E.O. 14024 that authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions against any individual or entity that operate or have operated in the quantum computing sector of Russian economy. This action builds on previous determinations providing for sanctions against those that operate or have operated in the accounting, trust and corporate formation, management consulting, aerospace, marine, electronics, financial services, technology, and defense and related materiel sectors of Russian economy.All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in: (a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; and (b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. FAQ 1085 clarifies that the Determination Pursuant to Section 1(a)(i) of EO 14024 authorizes the imposition of economic sanctions against persons that operate or have operated in the quantum computing sector of the Russian Federation economy and that not all persons operating in the quantum computing sector are sanctioned by OFAC. A determination exposes persons that operate or have operated in an identified sector to sanctions risk; however, a sector determination does not automatically impose sanctions on all persons who operate or have operated in the sector. Only persons determined, pursuant to EO 14024, by the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the Secretary of State, or by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, or their delegates, to operate or have operated in the above-identified sectors are subject to sanctions. FAQ 1086 states that OFAC interprets the term “quantum computing sector of the Russian Federation economy” to include activities related to products and services in or involving the Russian Federation in research, development, manufacturing, assembling, maintenance, repair, sale, or supply of quantum computing, quantum computers, electronic assemblies thereof, or cryogenic refrigeration systems related to quantum computing. OFAC also interprets the term “quantum computing sector of the Russian Federation economy” to include any of the following services when related to quantum computing: “infrastructure, web hosting or data processing services; custom computer programming services; computer systems integration design services; computer systems and data processing facilities management services; computing infrastructure, data processing services, web hosting services, and related services; repairing computer, computer peripherals, and communication equipment; other computer-related services; as well as the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, of quantum computing, quantum computers, electronic assemblies thereof, or cryogenic refrigeration systems related to quantum computing to or from the Russian Federation.” Link to the original

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from May 12, 2022 suspended the general licenses that previously permitted export of radioactive material, and deuterium for nuclear end use from the US to Russia. Exporters are no longer authorized to use the general license to export radioactive material, or deuterium for nuclear end use, to Russia and now must apply for a specific license pursuant to NRC regulations. Link to the original

*** The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued a final rule updating the scope of License Exceptions Authorized Cybersecurity Exports (“ACE”) and Encryption Commodities, Software, and Technology (“ENC”) related to cybersecurity items in response to public comments on the interim final rule related to cybersecurity items published on October 21, 2021. The interim final rule established a new control on certain cybersecurity items for National Security (NS) and Anti-terrorism (AT) reasons and created License Exception ACE in Section 740.22 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”), which authorizes exports of identified cybersecurity items to most destinations except in certain circumstances. These items warrant controls because these tools could be used for surveillance, espionage, or other actions that disrupt, deny or degrade the network or devices on it. The Final Rule makes the following revisions to the EAR, as follows: - An illustrative list of “Government end users” was added to License Exception ACE, which includes (i) international government organizations, (ii) government-operated research institutions, (iii) “more-sensitive government end users,” (iv) “less-sensitive government end users” (as both of these terms are already defined in Section 772.1 of the EAR), and (v) utilities, transportation hubs and services, and retail or wholesale firms wholly or partially operated or owned by a government or governmental authority. “Partially operated or owned by a government or governmental authority” means that a foreign government owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 25 % or more of the voting securities of the foreign entity or a foreign government or governmental authority has the authority to appoint a majority of board members of the foreign entity. - In respect of exports of “digital artifacts” (related to a cybersecurity incident involving information systems owned or operated “government end user”) to “government end users” in Country Group D, License Exception ACE has been narrowed to only allow for such exports to police or judicial bodies in Country Group D countries that are also listed in Country Group A:6 and only for purposes of criminal or civil investigations or prosecutions of such cybersecurity incidents. - A new end use restriction was added to License Exception ENC in Section 740.17(f) of the EAR such that ENC is not authorized for the following items if an exporter “knows” or has “reason to know” that the following items will be used to affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems, without authorization of the owner, operator, or administrator of the information system: “Cryptanalytic items,” classified in ECCNs 5A004.a, 5D002.a.3.a or c.3.a, or 5E002; Network penetration tools described in Section 740.17(b)(2)(i)(F) of the EAR, and ECCN 5E002 technology therefor; Automated network vulnerability analysis and response tools described in Section 740.17(b)(3)(iii)(A) of the EAR, and ECCN 5E002 technology therefor. BIS considered this change necessary to prevent evasion of one of the end-use restrictions in License Exception ACE, i.e., by adding cryptographic or cryptanalytic functionality to a cybersecurity item and exporting, reexporting, or transferring (in-country) the resulting item under License Exception ENC. Link to the original

BIS removed one Aeroflot, two Royal Flight, and one Utair aircraft from the list of aircraft that have flown into Russia and/or Belarus in apparent violation of the EAR. Link to the original

OFAC issued a Determination pursuant to E.O. 14068 of March 11, 2022 (“Prohibiting Certain Imports, Exports, and New Investment With Respect to Continued Russian Federation Aggression”) prohibiting import of gold of Russian origin. Russian-origin gold includes gold produced, manufactured, extracted, or processed in Russia but not gold that has been incorporated or substantially transformed into a foreign-made product (FAQ 1019). Link to the original

A new visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that applies to Russia-backed or Russia-installed purported authorities who are believed to have been involved in human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, or public corruption in Ukraine, including in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” or “Luhansk People’s Republic.” Family members of those who fall under the policy will also be ineligible for visas. Link to the original

A new visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that applies to Russia-backed or Russia-installed purported authorities who are believed to have been involved in human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, or public corruption in Ukraine, including in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” or “Luhansk People’s Republic.” Family members of those who fall under the policy will also be ineligible for visas. Link to the original

BIS issued the “Russia Industry Sector Sanctions Expansion” rule expanding the Russian industry sector sanctions to cover additional items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”) beyond restrictions targeting the Russian energy sector. The final rule imposes a U.S. license requirement on exports, reexports, and transfers of hundreds of items with industrial and commercial applications. Under the Russia industry sector sanctions, all items identified in Supplement No. 4 to part 746 of the EAR that are subject to the EAR trigger a licensing requirement when they are exported, reexported, or transferred (in-country) to or within Russia. The items in Supplement No. 4 are classified as EAR99 and would not otherwise require authorization for export, reexport, or transfer to or within Russia. Covered list of goods include industrial equipment and materials that are widely used by Russian industry and deemed to support Russian military capabilities. The items are classified by both Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) and U.S. Schedule B number. In total, 205 HTS codes at the 6-digit level and 478 corresponding 10-digit Schedule B numbers were added to the list of items subject to Russian industry sector export controls. The list consists of a wide range of wood products, machinery, parts, and related industrial items, such as, among others, certain boring machines, gear grinding or finishing machines, planing machines, industrial engines, boilers, motors, fans, and ventilation equipment, bulldozers, bending or assembling machines, doweling machines, sorting machines, machine tools, wood veneer, barrels and casks, hydraulic power engines, parts of air or vacuum pumps, air conditioning machines, automotive air condemner, heat exchangers, icemaking machines, refrigerated drinking water coolers, soda fountain and beer dispensing equipment, oil or fuel filters for internal combustion engines, fire extinguishers, printing machines, and dry-cleaning machines. BIS will review license requests for exports, reexports, and transfers of such items pursuant to a policy of denial, unless the proposed shipments are necessary for health and safety reasons or to meet humanitarian needs. Link to the original

A new visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that applies to Russian Federation military officials who are believed to have been involved in human rights abuses, violations of international humanitarian law, or public corruption in Ukraine, including in the so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” or “Luhansk People’s Republic.” Family members of those who fall under the policy will also be ineligible for visas. Link to the original

The White House further expanded U.S. sanctions against Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine by issuing a new Presidential Proclamation 10371 banning all Russian-affiliated vessels from entering any U.S. port in response to Russia’s continued aggression in Ukraine, effective on April 28, 2022, except for certain limited situations. Banned vessels include vessels of Russian registry (i.e., the vessel is Russian flagged), vessels owned by Russian persons, and vessels that are Russian operated. The order authorizes the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to issue regulations to implement the ban. Link to the original