Export volumes and revenues collapse in February; as war in Iran drives oil prices – and Russia’s revenue outlook – sharply higher

In February 2026, Russia’s oil export revenues collapsed by ~$1.5 billion month-on-month to $9.5 billion – the lowest level since the invasion began – according to the March edition of the Russian Oil Tracker by KSE Institute. The sharp drop in seaborne export volumes by 9.2% MoM was the primary driver. In result, crude revenues dropped to $5.9 billion and oil product revenues – to $3.6 billion. At the same time, the US-Israeli conflict with Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz are already pushing global oil prices sharply higher – and with them, Russia’s projected oil revenues.

Russian seaborne oil exports fell by 9.2% MoM and 5.3% YoY in February. Crude shipments declined by 2.8% over the month, while oil product exports dropped by 18%. Russia’s reliance on Western maritime services grew to 45%, with IG P&I-insured tankers carrying 30% of crude and 70% of oil products.

Of the 621 oil tankers designated by at least one jurisdiction, 111 loaded Russian oil in February – 32 fewer than in January. During March, Canada imposed sanctions on 97 tankers, thereby adding two unique ones that had not previously been sanctioned by any other country. The total number has increased to 623 vessels.

KSE Institute estimates that 143 shadow fleet tankers carrying crude and oil products departed Russian ports or conducted ship-to-ship (STS) transfers in February 2026, with 94% of these vessels older than 15 years.

In the first half of March, US-sanctioned producers Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazpromneft, and Surgutneftegaz recovered their share in crude exports to 18%, after it had fallen to just 5% in January–February 2026. Over the same period, the combined share of UAE-based Redwood Global Supply FZE LLC and Alghaf Marine DMCC edged down to 34% from 39% in February.

Throughout January–February 2026, India maintained steady imports of around 1 mb/d of Russian crude (-39% vs. 2025 average), representing approximately 20% of its total seaborne imports. China continued to expand its purchases every month since November 2025, reaching 1.9 mb/d in February (+64% vs. 2025 average) – around 17% of total Chinese seaborne imports.

Russian crude volumes on the water climbed to 160 mb following a brief dip to 148 mb tied to OFAC’s General Licence 134, which temporarily authorised transactions involving Russian oil loaded on or before 12 March. Oil product volumes at sea rose from 62 mb in October 2025 to 93 mb by March 2026, driven by US sanctions on Lukoil and Rosneft.

In February, 24 tankers loaded in Russia under new flags after previously sailing from Russian ports under falsified ones: 12 reflagged to Cameroon, 5 to Sierra Leone, 5 to Russia, and 2 to Oman.

Average Urals FOB prices rose by ~$3/bbl MoM to ~$42.8/bbl in February, still trading below the EU’s revised price cap. ESPO FOB Kozmino gained ~$6/bbl to reach ~$54.1/bbl. The outbreak of the US-Israeli conflict with Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz then drove a further ~$40/bbl increase in Urals and ESPO prices by March 18.

According to KSE Institute estimates, the Middle East conflict has fundamentally reshaped the outlook for Russia’s oil revenues. In the base case – current price caps, sanctions status quo, and a conflict lasting up to three months – revenues could surge from $158 billion in 2025 to $229 billion in 2026. Under the optimistic scenario, with stronger sanctions enforcement and a conflict of up to six weeks, revenues would rise more modestly to $162 billion in 2026. In the most adverse scenario – weak enforcement and six months of active conflict – revenues could reach $304 billion in 2026.